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Abstract
Social movements can disrupt existing industries and inspire the emergence of new markets by
drawing attention to problems with the status quo and promoting alternatives. We examine how the
influence of social movements on entrepreneurial activity evolves as the markets they foster mature.
Theoretically, we argue that the success of social movements in furthering market expansion leads to
three related outcomes. First, the movement-encouraged development of market infrastructure
reduces the need for continued social movement support. Second, social movements’ efforts on
behalf of new markets increase the importance of resource availability for market entry. Third,
market growth motivates countermovements that reduce the beneficial impact of initiator
movements on entrepreneurial activity. We test these arguments by analyzing evolving social
movement dynamics and entrepreneurial activity in the US wind power industry from 1992 to 2007.
We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of social movements, stakeholder
management, sustainability, and entrepreneurship.

Keywords: social movements, countermovements, sustainability, entrepreneurship, stakeholder management,
industry evolution

Research on entrepreneurship and industry creation has shown that new markets are often inspired
by collective action engaged in by social movements. As this research illustrates, social movement
organizations represent important stakeholders that can promote entrepreneurial activity by
generating demand for innovative products by highlighting problems with existing practices and
advocating alternatives (e.g., Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009; Rao, 1998; Weber, Heinze, and
DeSoucey, 2008; York, Hargrave, and Pacheco, 2016). Recently, scholars have investigated the
unexpected ways that social movement effects diffuse from their original targets to new domains
(Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; Giugni, 1998; Soule, 2012). For example, the Progressive movement’s
championing of rational bureaucracy as the solution to problems of social organization made
possible the growth of the bureaucratic form of thrift and hastened the decline of the older
community-oriented form (Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri, 2007), while the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union challenged the brewing industry and, in so doing, unexpectedly generated
entrepreneurial opportunities for producers of non-alcoholic beverages (Hiatt et al., 2009). Other
studies demonstrate how environmental activists have inspired opportunities for sustainable goods
and services, such as alternative energy (Durand and Georgallis, 2018; Pacheco, York, and Hargrave,
2014; Sine and Lee, 2009; Vasi, 2009;), sustainable food (Lee, Hiatt and Lounsbury, 2017; Weber et
al., 2008), and recycling (Lounsbury, Ventresca, Hirsch, 2003). Although a few studies have
considered how industries inspired by social movements evolve (Pacheco et al., 2014; York et al.,
2016), prior research remains limited in explaining how the influence of social movements on
market activity changes as these industries mature.
We advance this research agenda in two ways. First, we respond to calls to consider how the
impact of social movements on entrepreneurial activity evolves as markets develop (Hiatt et al.,
2009; Pacheco et al., 2014; Sine and Lee, 2009). We argue that social movements play an important
role in supporting entrepreneurship during the earliest years of industry emergence, but their role
diminishes as markets mature. Early in an industry’s history, when it is not well known or accepted
as legitimate, when there is no infrastructure to support the market, and when its profitability is
uncertain, social movements can be critical for the success of new markets. During these tenuous
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times, social movements serve as a substitute for industry associations and infrastructure that has
not yet been established (Tolbert, David, and Sine, 2011).
However, as new industries expand they become more legitimate (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994;
Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and authoritative actors like the state become involved. In addition,
market infrastructure develops, in the form of suppliers of specialized resources and dedicated
distribution systems (Pacheco, et al., 2014; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Collective bodies, such as
industry, trade, and professional associations, are important elements of market infrastructure: they
promote expanding industries and support entrepreneurs and managers (Sine et al., 2005; Weber et
al., 2008). In turn, legitimacy, state support, market infrastructure, and improved economic potential
enhance entrepreneurs’ access to the resources needed to launch new ventures (Lee, Struben, and
Bingham, 2018), and reduce the need for entrepreneurs to rely on the support of social movements.
Second, we investigate the dynamics between movements and counter movements
(Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2017; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). In new markets supported by
social movements, entrepreneurs often pursue economic and moral objectives simultaneously,
because such markets become infused with the moral values of the supportive social movements. In
such markets, pioneering entrepreneurs tend to be motivated not only by the possibility of economic
returns, but also by the chance to achieve the movement’s goals and support its values. As markets
develop, they offer better profit opportunities and attract entrepreneurs who, compared to their
predecessors, are motivated more by economic returns and less by movement ideologies; therefore,
moral and economic imperatives within the sector become increasingly at odds (Lee et al., 2017).
Tensions between economic and moral objectives can spawn opposition from previously supportive
actors, and can give rise to grievances aired by previously uninvolved or neutral actors (Zald and
Useem, 1987). Opponents can mobilize resources, attract allies, and engage in tactics to thwart
further market development: in short, they can develop into counter movements. For example, the
growth of the solar power industry resulted in unexpected industrial waste, which conflicts with the
industry’s objective of not harming the environment; this conflict spawned opposition movements
(e.g., LaFraniere, 2011). Although counter movements may have substantial impacts on market entry,
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previous research has generally overlooked these factors by focusing on their implications for state
policy and initiator movements (Ingram and Rao, 2004; Staggenborg and Meyer, 1998; Zald and
Useem, 1987).
Both the changing impact of social movements and the rise of counter movements are
driven by market development. Accordingly, we analyze them simultaneously by studying a market
that expanded substantially and that was supported by a social movement: the US wind power
industry from 1992 to 2007. Like other chapters in this volume that explore sustainability related
contexts, the wind power industry provides a fitting setting to examine the dynamics between
activists promoting and opposing an ideologically motivated market. We use state level panel data on
all wind farms founded in the US during this period to test our hypotheses about the evolving role
of initiator and counter movements on entrepreneurial activity in this growing market.
The Evolving Impact of Social Movements on Founding Rates
Social movements and new markets
Entrepreneurs in new markets face significant challenges. First, new markets are often not perceived
as cognitively or socio-politically legitimate (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Sine et al., 2005). Cognitively,
their novelty makes it difficult for stakeholders such as potential customers, employees, and state
authorities to understand their constituent organizations. Socio-politically, the use of innovative
technologies and the production of novel goods and services may not conform to existing norms
and expectations of how business is conducted. As a result, entrepreneurs in nascent industries must
deal with skeptical state authorities.
Second, organizations in a new market have access to few, if any, industry-specific resources:
few educational institutions to teach employees skills that have market-specific utility, limited
suppliers of specialized materials or equipment, few funding sources that understand their particular
“value proposition,” and minimal collective efforts in the form of industry associations to promote
the market or provide technical assistance to market participants. This dearth of resources forces
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entrepreneurs to jerry-rig existing resources, both material and cultural (Baker and Nelson, 2005;
Rao, 1998).
Third, profits are often elusive. In some new markets, new kinds of organizations use
innovative technologies to produce existing products differently, such as “green” electric power
(Sine et al., 2005), or produce novel kinds of products, like biotechnology drugs (Stuart, Hoang, and
Hybels, 1999). In other new markets, new kinds of organizations redeploy existing technologies in
new ways to produce novel kinds of products, such as magazines in eighteenth-century America
(Haveman, 2015). In all three situations, new ventures hope profits will come when underlying
technologies improve and markets expand. To improve profit potential, entrepreneurs must either
work to reduce costs by improving the efficiency and reliability of their technologies, or experiment
with product attributes and revenue models to enhance their value proposition to customers.
Support from sympathetic social movements outside new industries – those whose values
and goals are congruent the new industries’ own – can help to mitigate these challenges. Social
movements can benefit new industries through a combination of strategic framing, resource
mobilization, and the creation and exploitation of favorable political opportunity structures (Rao,
Morrill, and Zald, 2000; York and Lenox, 2014). We discuss each in turn below.
Strategic framing. Frames are “schemata of interpretation,” (Goffman, 1974: 21) that reduce
complexity and help actors perceive, interpret, and act effectively. For social movements, frames are
words, symbols, stories, and actions that are deployed to organize social facts and events into a
narrative congruent with movement values and goals (Hiatt and Carlos, 2017; Snow, Rochford,
Worden, and Benford, 1986). Frames elaborate movement grievances and interests, highlight
problems with the status quo, diagnose the causes of these problems, and provide solutions.
Strategic framing spurs collective attributions and legitimates social movement goals and tactics. For
example, women’s groups secured voting rights when they argued that women would use their
franchise to protect children, homes, and families because this frame convinced skeptics that voting
rights would reinforce women’s traditional gender roles (McCammon et al., 2001).
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Strategic framing by social movements helps new markets in three ways. First, it legitimates
movements’ goals and tactics, as well as the types of organizations required to achieve them. Second,
it energizes potential entrepreneurs by disseminating information, making potential entrepreneurs
aware of opportunities in those markets (Shane, 2000). Third, it creates acceptance of and demand
for new industries’ products by touting them as solutions to the problems targeted by supportive
social movements, creating favorable attributions in the minds of potential employees, customers,
suppliers, and state agencies (Hiatt and Carlos, 2017).
Resource mobilization. Mobilization involves recruiting and retaining members, coordinating
activities, and acquiring resources (Gamson, 1990; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Social movement and
allied organizations (such as professional and trade associations, affiliated media, or sympathetic
non-profits) are powerful mobilizing devices. For example, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference was built on the institutional infrastructure of black churches (Morris, 1984).
Entrepreneurs in new markets can leverage the established structures of intermediaries, such as
social movement organizations to overcome resistance by state agencies, and other stakeholders
(Armanios et al., 2017) and to access to information and resources (Shane, 2000). Movements can
also create incentives and promote supportive norms and structures. For example, environmental
groups supported the development of the Forest Stewardship Council certification to seed a market
for sustainable forest products by developing standards and monitoring mechanisms (Cashore, Auld,
and Newsom, 2004).
Political opportunities. Many social movements seek to change society by pushing for laws,
policies and judicial decisions that are congruent with movement values (Tilly, 1986). If successful,
social movements alter political opportunity structures, making them more favorable to movement
goals (Tarrow, 1993). The state policies promoted by social movements have both coercive and
normative power. Coercively, they constrain or enable particular behaviors. Movement-promoted
state policies can also provide financial incentives or disincentives for certain behaviors, thereby
altering the underlying economics. For example, anti-abortion activists pushed state legislators to
restrict the use of Medicaid funds to pay for abortion services (Levine, 2004). Movement-promoted
5

state policies can also raise or lower standards for accountability and widen or narrow the legally
acceptable range of structures and activities. For instance, investor-rights activists persuaded the
Securities and Exchange Commission to expand the issues open to shareholder votes, thus
subjecting corporate executives to greater scrutiny (Davis and Thompson, 1994). Normatively,
movement-promoted state policies increase understanding and social acceptance of promoted
behaviors and reduce acceptance of prohibited behaviors (Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Minkoff,
1994). For example, the civil rights movement’s advances in voting spilled over to the workplace,
when valorization of the due process protections in civil rights law legitimated demands for fair
treatment at work (Edelman, 1990).
For new markets, social movements can create political opportunities in several ways. Most
basically, they open up new markets. For example, cannabis activists legitimated the medical use of
cannabis and lobbied for its legalization for medical purposes (Dioun, 2018). Movement-supported
legal changes can also improve the legitimacy of new markets. For instance, the 1983 Supreme Court
decision upholding a provision in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act requiring utilities to
purchase power from independent power plants at reasonable prices provided a strong endorsement
for this new market (Betts, 1983; Nowak, 1983; Sine et al., 2005).
Market expansion and the declining impact of social movements
Increases in the number of firms, and the consequent enhancement of market legitimacy, promote
the development of industry-specific pools of resources: specialized funding, raw materials,
equipment, and personnel; tailored distribution systems; and supportive collective bodies, such as
trade and industry associations (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Pacheco et al., 2014). Only when new
markets have grown will resource suppliers be motivated to customize their products to suit new
markets’ idiosyncratic needs. And only when new markets have grown will there be a critical mass to
support collective action (Lee et al., 2018).
Together, increased market legitimacy, the development of state support, and the formation
of industry infrastructures—all driven by market expansion—make it easier for would-be
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entrepreneurs to acquire resources and launch new ventures (Durand and Georgallis, 2018;
Georgallis, Dowell, and Durand, 2018). This makes strategic framing, resource mobilization, and
political opportunity creation by social movements less necessary. First, as the values promoted by
social movements become widely accepted, less effort is required to legitimate them. Second, as
market infrastructure develops, entrepreneurs have less need of support from social movements.
Third, as movement values become embedded in state policies, entrepreneurs become less
dependent on social movement support (Meek, Pacheco, and York, 2010). In sum, as markets
develop, social movement influence declines, due to enhanced market legitimacy, profitability, state
support, and infrastructure. These improvements encourage entrepreneurship. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Increases in the number of organizations in a new market will attenuate the positive
impact of social movements on foundings.
Hypothesis 1b: Increased state support for a new market will attenuate the positive impact of social
movements on foundings.
Market expansion and the growing importance of resources
In markets supported by social movements, entrepreneurs are often ideologically motivated. The
content of entrepreneurs’ ideologies varies widely and may emphasize non-instrumental outcomes,
making entrepreneurs more willing to take the risk of launching ventures, even though they are
unlikely to earn profits (Lee et al., 2018). In such cases, the ideologies that drive entrepreneurs are
often the movements’ own (Vasi, 2011; York and Lenox, 2014). For example, in the early thrift
industry, the Progressive movement’s celebration of rational bureaucracy became instantiated in
organizational forms that valued impartiality, bureaucratic control, and flexible voluntary effort by
rational savers (Haveman and Rao, 1997).
As new markets expand, they become more economically viable due to their enhanced
legitimacy, state support, demand for their products and services, and infrastructure. Moreover,
technological advances (in production or distribution systems or products themselves) can further
enhance expanding economic viability, which attract a range of entrepreneurs to expanding
markets—those who may be more motivated by economic considerations than ideological ones.
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Thus, “ideological push” gives way to “market pull” (Hiatt et al., 2009: 646). For profit-seeking
entrepreneurs, instrumental concerns (e.g., resource availability) are more important than
transcendental concerns (i.e., social movement support). Therefore, we predict:
Hypothesis 2a: Increases in the number of organizations in a new market will amplify the positive
impact of the availability of natural resources on foundings.
Hypothesis 2b: Increased state support for a new market will amplify the positive impact of the
availability of natural resources on foundings.
The rise of counter movements
The changes that social movements promote can unleash new grievances and give rise to counter
movements (Zald and Useem, 1987). Indeed, successful social movements not only spark counter
movements, they also provide blueprints for action (Strang and Soule, 1998). If the changes initiated
by social movements threaten some group and if initiator movements show signs of success, then
counter movements are more likely to mobilize in opposition to initiator movements (Meyer and
Staggenborg, 1996). For example, the anti-abortion movement was galvanized by the success of the
pro-abortion movement; specifically, the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision upholding women’s rights to
abortion (Staggenborg, 1991). The very growth of social movements sows the seeds of opposition:
growing movements draw in more diverse supporters, many of whom utilize frames that differ from
those deployed by movements’ original core constituents. For instance, from the mid 1950s to the
early 1970s, some black activists began to engage in increasingly militant behavior that was at odds
with the moderate mainstream civil rights movement (Haines, 1988).
News media often support counter movements, as journalists craft “balanced” narratives
that present both sides of a conflict (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). For example, media accounts of the
Students for a Democratic Society highlighted right-wing opposition to the movement (Gitlin,
1980). Balanced media attention increases the salience of the issues contested by counter movements
and creates perceptions that change is possible, revealing opportunities for oppositional mobilization
(Kingdon, 1984; Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996).
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New markets supported by social movements can also give rise to counter movements. As
explained above, pioneering entrepreneurs often seek to achieve movement ideals, rather than just
earn profits. Ideologically motivated entrepreneurs create value-rational (wertrational) organizations,
which reflect their beliefs in substantive principles rather than just efficiency or profitability
(DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; Weber, 1978: 24-26). Thus, in new markets, entrepreneurs’ ideologies
can be reflected in their ventures’ goals, strategies, structures, and products. These ideologies
become imprinted on new markets and over time, they become enduring elements of these markets’
blueprints for action.
Counter movements use counter-framing techniques to rebut and challenge the version of
reality constructed by initiator movements (Benford, 1993; Cornelissen and Werner, 2014; Esacove,
2004; Litrico and David, 2017). Counter movements also woo sympathetic elites, such as religious,
community, or business leaders, who have related grievances: religious leaders because initiator
movements threaten their flocks; community leaders because initiator movements threaten their
environs; and business leaders because initiator movements threaten their profits. For instance, the
Catholic Church was an early supporter of the anti-abortion movement (Staggenborg, 1991). When
counter movements mobilize, initiator movements face increased competition for resources
(Koopmans, 1993). Counter movement mobilization also threatens the reputation and profitability
of firms in movement-supported markets (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; King and Soule, 2007; Vasi and
King, 2012), and firms’ ability to attract resources (McDonnell and Werner, 2016). In sum, counter
movements reduce the effectiveness of initiator movements and threaten the economic prospects of
firms in movement-supported markets. Thus we predict:
Hypothesis 3a: Increases in counter movement activities will reduce foundings in markets supported
by initiator movements.
Hypothesis 3b: Increases in counter movement activities will attenuate the positive impact of
initiator movements on foundings in markets supported by initiator movements.
Hypothesis 3c: Increases in counter movement activities will attenuate the positive impact of resource
availability on foundings in markets supported by initiator movements.
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Research Site: The US wind power industry
The growth of wind power in the US
The story of the modern US wind industry begins in October 1973, when the Oil Producing
and Exporting Countries embargoed shipments of oil to the US, creating nation-wide oil and gas
shortages. The Iranian Revolution of 1978 exacerbated these shortages. As a result, oil and gas prices
skyrocketed and residential electricity prices nearly doubled. In the wake of the energy crisis, a new
opportunity opened for the environmental movement, which had mushroomed into a mass
movement after the first Earth Day in 1970. Environmental activists pushed for use of energyefficient technology and renewable energy sources, and raised awareness of the dangers “brown”
energy sources posed to the environment.
Mounting economic pressure and social activism pushed policymakers to promote
electricity-generating technologies that would decrease dependence on foreign oil, culminating in the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978. By requiring electric utilities to connect
with and purchase electricity from nonutility power plants, PURPA opened access to electricity
markets. Hundreds of entrepreneurs submitted applications to construct wind generation facilities
(Russo, 2001; Sine and Lee, 2009). Then, as oil prices fell in the mid-1980s, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 cancelled federal tax credits for wind power. This loss of financial support had a tremendous
negative effect on the market. The situation improved in 1992 with the passage of the Energy Policy
Act, which offered federal wind tax credits and allowed independent-power producers, including
wind farms, to sell power directly to local distributors, rather than power generators (Asmus, 2001).
As a result, the wind power industry began to expand again. At the end of 2016, installed capacity
provided enough energy to power 24 million homes, surpassing hydroelectric capacity and provided
jobs for over 100,000 Americans (American Wind Energy Association, 2016).
As the wind power market grew, the value of wind energy as a nonpolluting “green”
technology became increasingly accepted. Large industrial concerns, such as General Electric, and
prominent investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs, made major investments in wind power.
Industry associations developed apace; attendance at American Wind Energy Association (AWEA)
10

conferences grew ten-fold from 2,300 in 2002 to 23,000 in 2009. AWEA became a formidable
advocate for the industry: its public relations staff work with news media to disseminate positive
information about the industry, its lobbyists push for legislation favorable to wind power, and its
website hosts information that wind developers can use as they try to win support for their projects.
Opposition to wind power
Despite wind power’s increasing legitimacy, the market has not gone unchallenged. “Not in my
backyard” (NIMBY) activists, who support the development of wind power in principle but oppose
wind farms in their vicinity, appeared across the country (Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1992; Gipe,
1995; Pasqualetti, Gipe, and Righter, 2002). Consider, for example, the mission statement of the
largest NIMBY organization in the US, the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (2011):
The Alliance supports wind power as an alternative energy source. However, we
oppose the proposed Cape Wind plant in Nantucket Sound due to potential adverse
economic, environmental and public safety impacts.
One of the most common NIMBY objections is that the natural landscape is ruined by the
construction of wind turbines. NIMBYs also cite concerns regarding the impact of wind turbines on
migratory birds and bats. Such concerns have resulted in many wind farms being delayed as
environmental impact studies are carried out. Still other NIMBYs point to health and safety issues
posed by wind farms. For example, wind opponents often complain about “wind turbine
syndrome,” which they believe affects people living near wind turbines, involving sleep disturbance,
headaches, vertigo, nausea, irritability, and other physical and mental disorders (Pierpont, 2009).
NIMBYs have adopted pro-wind activists’ tactic of pointing to scientific evidence and expert
testimonies to support their claims. For example, organizations such as National Wind Watch,
Alliance to Save Our Sound, and Stop Ill Wind provide data on their websites about the adverse
environmental impacts of wind power; they also criticize the reported technological and economic
benefits touted by wind power supporters.
Wind market participants are well aware of the NIMBY counter movement. In interviews,
prominent wind developers frequently identified NIMBY activism as one of the more difficult
11

challenges they face. A wind developer in New York bemoaned the delay of his wind farm, stating:
“if it wasn’t for the time it has taken to deal with the concerns of the NIMBY’s, these turbines
would already be up and running... I’m losing $1,500 a day for every day they’re not in the ground.”
Another developer had spent years working on a wind farm that was eventually cancelled because of
local opposition. He said, “We learned something from that one and now we take local opinions
seriously. If we get the feeling that there is going to be a big fight, it might not be worth it for us to
go there.” One developer spent over a year trying to win over local residents who were spooked by
the warnings of NIMBY activists. He chartered a bus to take local residents to a wind farm two
hours away so they could experience turbines in person, went door to door to talk with local
residents, and hosted weekly open houses to assuage their concerns about the proposed wind farm.
Research Design
Data Sources
To test the hypotheses developed above, we gathered data on all wind farm foundings in all US
states from 1992 to 2007. We use the state-year as our unit of analysis because most regulation of
this industry is at the state level. Our analysis starts in 1992 because the Energy Policy Act passed
that year significantly changed energy policy by offering federal wind tax credits and overhauling the
US energy regulatory regime. In 1992, wind power was still in its infancy, with only 1,680 MW of
installed capacity, compared to roughly 18,000 MW by the end of 2007. Our analysis ends in 2007
because the 2008 financial crisis fundamentally altered the economics of wind farm financing. The
primary source of funding for wind farms had been institutional investors seeking tax credits for
investments in renewable energy to offset tax liabilities from profits. As profits fell during the
“Great Recession,” the need for tax credits declined, so investment in renewables plummeted. By
2009, half of the institutional investors that had financed wind projects had left the field
(International Energy Agency, 2009).
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Measures
The dependent variable: wind farm foundings. Our outcome of interest is the number of new wind farms
founded in each state each year. Data come from the AWEA, the pre-eminent wind industry
association. All major American wind farm developers, wind-turbine manufacturers, and wind farm
operators are AWEA members; other members include electric utilities, government agencies, and
scientific researchers. AWEA obtains data on wind farm installations through a combination of selfreporting by wind farm operators and research by AWEA staff. All self-reported information is
reviewed by AWEA staff before inclusion in the dataset.
Resource availability. We measured the total acres of windy land suitable for wind power
production in each state each year. This includes all land areas with class 3 wind speeds—meaning
wind speeds greater than 6.4 meters/second at 50 meters above sea level, using data from the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the research-and-development arm of the Department of
Energy.
Initiator movements. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Sine and Lee, 2009; Vasi, 2009), we
collected data on the number of Sierra Club members in each state for each year. Founded in 1892,
the Sierra Club is one of the oldest and largest environmental organizations in the US (McCloskey,
1992). It has actively promoted the wind industry on several fronts: advocating state adoption of
policies that favor renewable energy, including wind power, and educating the populace about the
benefits of “green” energy sources and the hazards of “brown” sources.
The number of organizations (wind farms) in the market. We count the number of wind farms
operating in each state each year, using data from the AWEA. This provides a proxy for market
development.
State support. We assessed whether or not a state had passed legislation supporting wind
power. The most significant policy change affecting wind power is the adoption of a renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) policy (Bird et al., 2005). RPS policies mandate that all retail sellers of
electricity must obtain a certain portion of their electricity from renewable energy sources. Most RPS
policies include benchmarks that specify the percentage of energy that must come from renewable
13

sources by a certain date and impose stiff penalties on suppliers who do not meet guidelines.
Between 1992 and 2007, 27 states adopted RPS policies. We used a dummy variable to indicate
whether or not each state had an RPS in place each year, using data from the Database of State
Incentives for Renewable Energy. This is a comprehensive source of information on federal, state,
and local energy policies.
Counter movement activity: NIMBYs. NIMBY protests against wind power facilities were the
most common counter movement in this market. Following previous research (e.g., Koopmans and
Rucht, 2002), we collected data on NIMBY protest events from newspaper articles. Using the
NewsBank’s Access World News database, we searched for articles that include the following terms,
using Boolean logical operators: (“wind power” OR “wind turbine” OR “wind farm”) AND (nimby
OR protest OR oppose* OR against OR opponent*). This search yielded almost 20,000 articles. We
removed duplicate articles and articles that did not mention a specific date and location of a protest
event. The final sample of articles documents 1,618 protest events. On average, states experienced
1.07 protests per year, although there was great variation, as the standard deviation was 9.40.
Massachusetts was an extreme outlier, with, on average, 28 protests per year and a maximum
of 186 protests in 2003. Almost all targeted the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound, which
garnered significant national attention due to the visibility of opponents such as Ted Kennedy,
Robert Kennedy Jr., John Kerry, and Mitt Romney. We used two methods to mitigate the impact of
these outliers. First, in the analysis reported below, we winsorized this variable at the 1st and 99th
percentiles (Tukey, 1962). This involves replacing extreme values with the next-closest value within
the 1st – 99th percentile range. Second, in results not reported here, we dropped Massachusetts from
the sample analyzed. The results of this analysis were similar to those shown below.
Control variables. We controlled for state-level factors that may influence the founding of new
wind power producers: population density, percentage change in population, percent change in gross
state product, and personal income per capita. Population trends and state economics proxy statelevel demand for electricity and the overall economic environment for new means of power
production, respectively. The data for these variables come from the US Census Bureau. Foundings
14

increase over time, as market legitimacy increases and the economic viability of new technologies is
established (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), so we controlled for market age with a time-trend variable
beginning in 1978, the year PURPA was enacted. This year marked the initial opportunity for utilityscale wind power in the US. NewsBank’s Access World News database covered more newspapers for
certain states and years, so we also controlled for the number of newspapers in each state in the
database. This allowed us to remove bias due to the fact that some state-year observations had more
newspapers in the database, and so would be likely to have higher counts of NIMBY protests on
record.
Model Specification and Estimation
Because our dependent variable is a count (the number of new wind farms established in a given
state in a given year), we estimated event-count models. The data were over-dispersed and almost 80
percent of state-year observations had zero foundings. Both over-dispersion and excess zeros violate
assumptions of the traditional Poisson regression model, so we estimated zero-inflated negative
binomial models (ZINB) (Lambert, 1992). ZINB models account for the high percentage of zeros
using a two-stage modeling approach that makes use of both binary and count models (Long and
Freese, 2006; Hilbe, 2007). The first stage uses a logit model to determine which variables predict
zero counts. The second stage uses a negative-binomial count model to predict the count outcome
for non-zero cases.
The logit model included several measures that we expect would determine whether the
focal state would experience any (rather than zero) wind farm foundings in the focal year. First, we
included acres of available windy land and total landmass in each state. Second, since wind power
production may be driven by demand for electricity and economic conditions in energy markets, we
included the cost of electricity in each state each year, growth in state electricity consumption
(percentage change from the previous year), and the volume of electricity imports into each state.
The last variable captures the degree to which a state can currently produce enough energy to meet
local demand. These measures come from the Department of Energy.
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Because most wind farms take more than one year to establish (Wind Energy America,
2011), we lagged all independent variables by two years. Because the data include multiple
observations for each state over time, we clustered the data by state to handle within-state
correlations. We estimated robust standard errors to account for model misspecification (Arminger,
1995). Two variables, number of wind farms and Sierra Club membership, were highly correlated
(r=0.84). To reduce multicollinearity, we orthogonalized these variables through a modified GramSchmidt procedure (Golub and Van Loan, 1989), using the orthog command in Stata, which partials
out the common variance between related variables (J. Cohen and P. Cohen, 1983; Saville and
Wood, 1991).
Results
Table 1 presents univariate statistics and correlations for all variables in the analysis. Table 2 presents
zero-inflated negative-binomial models of the number wind farm foundings for state-year. The
Vuong test (Greene, 1994) confirmed that the ZINB model is statistically different from the baseline
negative-binomial model, which indicates that the ZINB model fits the data better. Model 1 in Table
2 presents a baseline model that contains all control variables; subsequent models add variables to
test our hypotheses in the order presented above. Each model shows the results for the negativebinomial model (second stage) above the results for the logit model (first stage).
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
Across all logit models in Table 2, the most consistently significant predictor of whether any
wind farms would be established was the state’s total landmass. Electricity costs and the volume of
electricity imports also predict wind farm foundings.
In the negative-binomial models, the effect of per capita personal income is positive and
generally statistically significant, suggesting that when and where people have higher incomes, they
can afford higher-priced wind power. The consistent positive effect of the number of existing wind
farms is consistent with prior research. Also consistent with prior research (Sine and Lee, 2009), we
found positive and significant effects of Sierra Club membership and the availability of windy land.

16

These results point to the importance of social movements and the availability of material resources
for entrepreneurial activity. Finally, state support in the form of an RPS policy has positive and
generally significant effects.
Model 2 shows that increases in the number of wind farms attenuated the positive impact of
social movements on foundings, supporting hypothesis 1a. Model 3 shows that increased state
support attenuated the positive effects of social movements on foundings, supporting hypothesis 1b.
Model 4 shows that increases in the numbers of wind farms amplified the positive impact of
resource availability on foundings. This effect was only marginally significant (p<0.097), so it only
weakly supports hypothesis 2a. Model 5 shows that increased state support for a new market
significantly amplified the positive impact of available resources on subsequent foundings,
supporting hypothesis 2b.
Model 6 shows that NIMBY protest events significantly decreased wind farm foundings,
supporting hypothesis 3a. Model 7 shows that these protests significantly diminished the initiator
movement’s positive impact on wind farm foundings, supporting hypothesis 3b. Model 8 shows that
the protests reduced the positive impact of material resources on wind farm foundings. But this
effect was non-significant, so it fails to support hypothesis 3c.
Discussion
Recent work has demonstrated that social movements can spur the development of new markets
when those markets are motivated by values that are congruent with the movements’ own (e.g.,
Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; Sine and Lee, 2009; Vasi, 2009). We advance research on this topic by
focusing attention on the environmental movement and its evolving impact on the US wind power
industry as that market expanded. Our results provide considerable support for the premise that as
new markets expand and become more legitimate, and as supportive state policies are implemented,
the impact of social movements on those markets is attenuated. In contrast, we found that
supportive state policies accentuate the impact of available resources (here, windy land) on
foundings. Our findings also demonstrate that public policy can reduce the risks entrepreneurs face.
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The adoption of favorable state policy serves as a strong signal of market legitimacy in general and
state support for the market in particular, which also appears to diminish the need for industry
support from social movements.
In addition, we considered how social movements’ success in spurring new markets can
generate new grievances for other actors, motivating them to form counter movements. As counter
movements attack initiator movements, the latter’s ability to support new markets is impeded. Our
results are consistent with prior research showing that counter movements can have negative
consequences for business (Ingram, Yue, and Rao, 2010), but the observed effect is small, perhaps
due to the fact that we analyzed data at the state level. This may obscure much NIMBY impact
because NIMBY’s focus is often local. For example, interviews with NIMBY activists revealed that
most NIMBY opposition consisted of local citizen groups opposed to the specific locations of
proposed wind farms. While NIMBYs may thwart wind farm developments nearby, wind developers
may try again in other locations where there less opposition. For example, when local opposition
halted the development of a wind farm in Springwater, New York, a spokesperson for the developer
stated, “we decided to focus our efforts on the development of wind projects in other parts of New
York” (Messenger Post Newspapers, 2006). Developers learned from experience and avoided
developing wind power in locations prone to NIMBY activism. Future studies conducted at lower
levels of geographic aggregation (e.g., at the county or municipal level) may reveal stronger, more
localized effects of NIMBYs than we found here.
Our findings have broad implications for scholars of social movements, entrepreneurship,
and nonmarket strategy. For social movement scholars, this paper addresses a call to “move beyond
single movements, and consider dynamic interactions among a multitude of contenders”
(Koopmans, 2004: 21). We investigate these dynamics by analyzing the emergence of NIMBYs, a
special kind of counter movement. Although a few studies have examined NIMBY activity (e.g.,
Dokshin 2016; Ingraham et al. 2010; Lounsbury et al., 2003), they place NIMBYs in the role of
initiator rather than challenger. In these studies, NIMBYs emerged in opposition to the
establishment of unwanted facilities, but they did not compete with the claims of another social
18

movement; instead, the interaction between NIMBYs and other social movements was mutually
beneficial. Our study highlights the possibility of competition between NIMBYs and initiator
movements. In our case, NIMBYs adopted ideologies that were similar to those of the initiator
movement and competed with the initiator movement for access to resources, attention, and allies.
Our findings suggest that the co-evolution of initiator and counter movements may include
dynamics not considered in existing theoretical treatments (e.g., Staggenborg and Meyer, 1996; Zald
and Useem, 1987).
Furthermore, these insights respond directly to calls from stakeholder management scholars
for future research to “…elucidate the interactions of stakeholder movements and
countermovements in markets” (Dorobantu et al., 2017:30). Despite the conceptualization of
stakeholders as heterogeneous actors who are affected by or who can affect market activities
(Freeman, 2010), prior research has generally taken an oversimplified view that casts social
movement stakeholders as homogenous actors who pursue a common agenda. This ignores the
differential impact of heterogeneous stakeholders on firms and markets (Hiatt, Carlos, and Sine,
2017). In addition, while prior work has considered how relationships with nonmarket stakeholders
can affect new-venture performance (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Siegel, 2007;
Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017), past work has paid little attention to normative actors such
as social movements, or the broader implications for market-level dynamics. Stakeholders that are
normative actors that frame particular activities as right or wrong and mobilize support or resistance
to such activities can have significant impacts on new markets and their constituents.
We also add to a small number of studies that consider the evolving impact of social
movements on different kinds of movement outcomes (Hiatt and Carlos, 2017; Pacheco et al., 2014;
York et al., 2016). Although prior research has considered how movements experience waves of
activity (e.g., Koopmans, 1993; Koopmans, 2004; Minkoff, 1997) and how they co-evolve with their
environment (Dioun, 2018; Koopmans, 2004; Oliver and Meyers, 2002; Pacheco et al., 2014), these
studies have largely focused on how movements themselves evolve. We instead analyze the evolving
impact of social movements. Despite growing attention to movement outcomes, notably activist19

driven policy changes (Cress and Snow, 2000; Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee, 2015; Soule and Olzak, 2004),
very few studies have considered how this impact evolves. A few recent exceptions have shown that
social movements have a significant impact during the initial stages of a political process, but that
this impact diminishes as the legal rules become more stringent and the consequentiality of action
increases before new legislation is passed (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin, 2005; Soule and King, 2006).
Our study also shows that the impact of social movements evolves, but we study the impact on
market development, rather than on public policy adoption.
Finally, this study contributes more broadly to research on organizations and
entrepreneurship. The application of social movement concepts to organizational theory has been
particularly useful in explaining institutional change (Davis, McAdam, Scott, and Zald, 2005). A few
recent studies have linked social movements to the creation of new markets (Dioun, 2018; Hiatt et
al., 2009; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine and Lee, 2009) and market categories and regulation (Lee,
2009; Weber et al., 2009). To date, however, research linking social movements to entrepreneurial
activity has centered on new markets and novel market categories, with little consideration of
whether or how social movement impacts evolve as markets mature, much less how social
movement impacts change when opposition movements arise. Our study specifically considers the
interaction between social movements and market development.
Conclusion
In accordance with the other chapters in this volume, we highlight the important role that
stakeholders play in influencing CSR and sustainability. Although our analysis focused on state level
foundings, we nevertheless see important opportunities for research that considers the evolving
dynamics among multiple stakeholders on firm level outcomes (Aguilera et al., 2007; Flammer and
Luo, 2016; Pacheco et al., 2014). For instance, future studies could examine additional factors that
may influence how stakeholders impact firm strategies (York and Lenox, 2014) and commitment to
these industries and issues (Durand and Georgallis, 2018). In particular, we encourage work that
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accounts for the interplay among multiple stakeholders and the evolving temporal effects of these
dynamics on firm level outcomes.
Furthermore, we point to opportunities to investigate potential unintended consequences of
stakeholder actions. Just as our findings show that the success of social movements led to their own
decreasing relevance in the wind industry, stakeholder pressures on firms may likewise produce
outcomes not initially intended or desired by these stakeholders. Although research indicates that
firms engaging in prosocial behaviors in response to stakeholder pressure (Ingram et al., 2010;
McDonnell and King, 2013), recent work suggests that pressure from stakeholders may also lead
firms to become overly modest or reluctant to talk about their positive social or environmental
activities. This is particularly salient if firms are concerned that talking about their good deeds may
put them at risk of being perceived as hypocritical, or inauthentic (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Kim and
Lyon, 2011; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). For stakeholders motivated to compel firms to engage in
CSR and sustainability initiatives, this act of “green hush”, or strategically remaining silent about
prosocial behviors may unintentionally stifle the diffusion of these positive activities. When
companies actively talk about the good things they are doing, it can lead to greater social pressure
for competitors to adopt similar practices and eventually institutionalize such activities, but this is
unlikely to happen if others are not aware of the prosocial activities that companies are involved in.
Finally, we see opportunities for studies that provide more nuanced insights into specific
tactics that stakeholders can use to inspire firms to engage in prosocial activities, including potential
contingencies that may influence the effectiveness of these tactics in varying institutional
environments (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Hiatt et al., 2017). Although our qualitative work uncovered
some of the tactics engaged in by promoters and opponents of wind power, additional work to
systematically codify and evaluate the effectiveness of these tactics on both industry and firm level
outcomes and across varying contexts remains an important avenue for future research.
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for All Variables
Variables

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

Population densityª

4.38

1.41

2

State population (annual percent change)

0.01

0.01

-0.16

3

Gross state product (annual percent
change)

0.06

0.03

-0.10

0.29

4

Personal income per capitaª

10.21

0.25

0.32

-0.03

0.01

5

Industry age

21.50

4.61

0.04

-0.04

0.01

0.79

6

Electronically archived state newspapers

11.49

21.54

0.32

-0.06

-0.04

0.46

0.37

7

Number of wind farms

3.62

11.99

0.02

-0.02

0.00

0.22

0.18

0.55

8

Renewable Portfolio Standard (1=yes;
0=no)

0.18

0.38

0.12

-0.00

0.01

0.46

0.37

0.35

0.27

9

Acres of windy land/10,000

4.74

7.88

-0.51

-0.09

0.03

-0.09

-0.00

-0.11

0.13

0.06

10

Number of Sierra Club members/1,000

12.83

25.68

0.26

0.02

-0.02

0.23

0.07

0.63

0.84

0.12

-0.10

11

Number of NIMBY protest events

0.97

2.92

0.15

-0.12

-0.03

0.36

0.33

0.48

0.20

0.38

-0.6

10

0.25

Notes: This table is based on 650 state-year observations of wind farm foundings from 1992 to 2007. ª Indicates the variable was log-transformed.
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Table 2. Zero-Inflated Negative-Binomial Models Predicting the Number of Wind Farm Foundings
(1)
-0.0310
(0.084)

(2)
-0.1453*
(0.074)

(3)
-0.0602
(0.077)

(4)
-0.0944
(0.088)

(5)
-0.0914
(0.069)

(6)
-0.0424
(0.073)

(7)
-0.0657
(0.071)

(8)
-0.0405
(0.074)

State population (annual percent change)

-19.3986
(12.383)

-18.9671
(11.899)

-19.0989
(11.826)

-22.1725+
(12.986)

-28.1559*
(10.947)

-21.7104+
(12.596)

-21.0081+
(12.100)

-21.6556+
(12.572)

Gross state product (annual percent change)

-1.6286
(3.194)

-0.7287
(3.243)

-1.1705
(3.174)

-0.8429
(3.238)

-0.8154
(2.993)

-1.6344
(3.238)

-1.4274
(3.227)

-1.6524
(3.228)

Personal income per capitaª

2.3134**
(0.884)

1.3618
(0.924)

2.2417**
(0.865)

1.7177+
(0.926)

1.7904*
(0.730)

2.3910**
(0.822)

2.2212**
(0.842)

2.3864**
(0.830)

Industry age

0.0438
(0.045)

0.0588
(0.043)

0.0386
(0.047)

0.0547
(0.042)

0.0691+
(0.040)

0.0519
(0.045)

0.0480
(0.044)

0.0526
(0.046)

Electronically archived state newspapers

-0.0161*
(0.008)

-0.0056
(0.006)

-0.0080
(0.007)

-0.0135*
(0.006)

-0.0120**
(0.004)

-0.0116*
(0.006)

-0.0063
(0.005)

-0.0119*
(0.006)

Number of wind farms

0.1700**
(0.062)

0.4229***
(0.109)

0.1562**
(0.057)

0.3097**
(0.105)

0.2527***
(0.073)

0.2041***
(0.057)

0.1881***
(0.056)

0.2017***
(0.057)

Renewable Portfolio Standard
(1=adopted; 0=not adopted)

0.9558**
(0.340)

0.8576*
(0.398)

1.1134**
(0.355)

0.9123*
(0.394)

0.1111
(0.334)

1.0520**
(0.339)

1.0471**
(0.359)

1.0358**
(0.353)

Acres of windy land/10,000

0.0473**
(0.018)

0.0419**
(0.015)

0.0468**
(0.017)

0.0347*
(0.016)

0.0294
(0.025)

0.0449**
(0.017)

0.0437*
(0.017)

0.0457*
(0.018)

Number of Sierra Club members/1,000

0.3830***
(0.031)

0.9531***
(0.217)

0.3792***
(0.034)

0.2844***
(0.054)

0.3441***
(0.030)

0.3627***
(0.029)

0.3788***
(0.038)

0.3642***
(0.030)

Population densityª

Wind farms ´ Sierra Club members
RPS ´ Sierra Club members

-0.0004**
(0.000)
-0.0092*
(0.004)

30

0.0026+
(0.002)

Wind farms ´ windy land

0.0897**
(0.031)

RPS ´ windy land

-0.0708*
(0.033)

NIMBY protest events

-0.0403
(0.040)

-0.0624
(0.042)

-0.0006*
(0.000)

NIMBY ´ Sierra Club members

-0.0019
(0.003)

NIMBY ´ windy land
-24.9670**
(8.379)

-15.2562+
(8.852)

-24.1211**
(8.176)

-18.8733*
(8.916)

-19.7572**
(7.236)

-25.825***
(7.758)

-23.9973**
(8.039)

-25.8048***
(7.835)

Acres of windy land/10,000

-1.5711
(0.970)

-1.2530+
(0.738)

-1.4372+
(0.843)

-1.4535+
(0.833)

-1.6359
(0.998)

-1.4935
(0.922)

-1.4176+
(0.837)

-1.5028
(0.935)

Total state land area/10,000

-0.1175**
(0.039)

-0.1051**
(0.033)

-0.1118**
(0.035)

-0.1146**
(0.036)

-0.1203**
(0.043)

-0.1133**
(0.038)

-0.1103**
(0.036)

-0.1137**
(0.038)

Electricity costª

-3.1716+
(1.768)

-3.3427*
(1.681)

-3.0440+
(1.723)

-3.4986+
(1.798)

-3.9543*
(1.699)

-3.1001+
(1.788)

-3.0819+
(1.725)

-3.0940+
(1.784)

Energy consumption (annual percent change)

8.1765
(10.460)

10.3326
(10.281)

9.0568
(10.341)

9.0930
(10.069)

8.4392
(10.153)

8.9160
(10.244)

9.3679
(10.098)

8.8342
(10.281)

Electricity imports

-0.0241+
(0.013)

-0.0294*
(0.013)

-0.0258*
(0.013)

-0.0266*
(0.013)

-0.0284*
(0.013)

-0.0260*
(0.013)

-0.0270*
(0.012)

-0.0259*
(0.013)

9.7229*
(4.456)
-0.6104
(0.860)
650
567.8020

9.7682*
(4.171)
-0.7671
(1.014)
650
537.5467

9.3249*
(4.319)
-0.6921
(0.996)
650
488.1870

10.4390*
(4.499)
-0.6670
(0.843)
650
544.0613

11.6348**
(4.344)
-0.7863
(1.443)
650
695.2847

9.5725*
(4.504)
-0.7266
(1.089)
650
691.3900

9.4592*
(4.335)
-0.7622
(1.138)
650
530.0477

9.5582*
(4.495)
-0.7226
(1.081)
650
947.1237

Constant
Inflation Model

Constant
ln[alpha]
N
c2
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Notes: This table is based on 650 state-year observations of wind farm foundings from 1992 to 2007. Standard errors are in parentheses below parameter estimates.
+ indicates p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, and *** p < 0.001, two-tailed t tests. ª Indicates the variable was log-transformed.
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